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 We assemble more pieces on the puzzle of the aid-corruption nexus. In essence, we 
extend the debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption by providing evidence on dynamic 
effects of wealth, legal origin, religious-domination, regional proximity, openness to sea, 
natural resources and politico-economic stability. The empirical evidence from dynamic panel 
GMM estimation is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. The findings 
show that the positive effect of foreign aid on corruption is most significant in: Middle-
income, French civil-law, Christian-dominated, non-oil exporting and landlocked countries. 
Moreover, there is also some scanty evidence of foreign aid increasing corruption-control in 
Lower Middle income and Not-landlocked countries. Justifications for the dynamics are 
discussed.  
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 The recent debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption has had an important 
influence in academic and policy circles (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2012a, 2013a; 
Asongu & Jellal, 2013). Policy implications from the debate in its current state are based on 
blanket recommendations across countries. However, it has recently been documented that 
fundamental characteristics of corruption substantially affect the modeling of corruption 
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(Kodila-Tedika, 2012, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Jellal & Bouzahzah, 2012; Musila, 2013; 
Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011; Hollyer & Wantchekon, 2012). In light of the above, this note 
assembles more pieces on the puzzle by providing dynamic assessments in terms of:  the 
wealth of nations, legal origins, religious-domination, regional proximity, openness to sea, 
natural resources and politico-economic stability (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Knack, 2001)
2
. The 
weight of these fundamental characteristics is important for more focused policy implications.  
 Consistent with Asongu & Jellal (2013), the puzzle can be discussed in three main 
strands. In the first strand, Asongu (2012a) has responded to the findings of Okada & Samreth 
(O & S) by partially negating their criticism of the mainstream approach to the aid-
development nexus. The empirical evidence of O & S (2012) which is based on a sample of 
120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009 concludes that development assistance 
mitigates corruption and its mitigating effect is greater in less corrupt countries. Asongu 
(2012a) on his side has concluded that the findings of O & S may not be relevant for African 
countries because foreign aid stifles (inflames) corruption-control (corruption). These 
contradictory findings are based on 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
 The second strand is based on comments from policy-making and academic circles 
that have informally criticized Asongu (2012a) for neglecting the conditional element on 
which the O & S policy recommendations are based (“…reduces corruption especially and its 
reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries” p.1).  In response to the growing 
criticisms, Asongu (2013a) has updated his account of the debate by: extending the realm of 
the puzzle from corruption to eight good governance indicators and fully considering the 
methodological underpinnings of O & S. Accordingly, the hypotheses underlying the 
empirical strategy is that the effect of aid maybe contingent on existing levels of institutional 
development such that countries with initially high levels of institutional quality respond 
differently to their counterparts with lower levels. When the O & S hypothesis on institutional 
benchmarks of development assistance are fully taken into account in the estimation strategy, 
the negative effect of foreign aid on institutional quality is overwhelmingly validated in 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010 (Asongu, 2013a). These findings have been 
subsequently confirmed in recent literature of the same scope and empirical strategy (Asongu, 
2013b, c).  
 The third strand is motivated by some scholars that have informally criticized the 
debate for not taking into account investment and fiscal policy channels. Consistent with 
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Asongu & Jellal (2013), the debate had remained within the findings of Fielding et al. (2006) 
on the straight forward relationship between development assistance and economic prosperity. 
Hence, drawing from the recommendations of Knack & Keefer (1995) on the need for more 
indicators in the assessment of institutions, Asongu & Jellal have extended the debate by 
providing an indirect dimension via modeling with transmission channels. The empirical 
evidence which is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 provides two main 
findings: while development assistance channeled via government expenditure increases 
corruption, foreign aid channeled via tax effort mitigates the scourge. 
 The present note focuses on the fourth strand of the debate that has arisen from 
informal criticisms by some researchers in policy-making and academic circles. According to 
them, the aid-corruption nexus is a complex and multidimensional relationship. Hence, the 
focus of the debate in Africa has to incorporate the heterogeneous nature of the continent, 
notably: wealth-effects (income-levels), colonial legacy (legal-origins), landlocked nature 
(openness to sea), natural resources (petroleum exporting countries for instance), regional 
proximity…etc. This note aims to extend the debate by taking the above points into account 
for more focused policy implications. The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses the data and outlines the methodology.  Section 3 covers the empirical analysis and 
corresponding discussion. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 Consistent with the literature underpinning of the debate, we examine a panel of 53 
African countries with data from the World Bank indicators for the period 1996-2010. 
Restricting the sample to this periodicity and focusing on African countries are in accordance 
with the papers underlying the debate
3
.  The dependent variables are the corruption perception 
index (CPI) and corruption-control index (Asongu, 2012a, 2013a; Okada & Samreth, 2012; 
Asongu & Jellal, 2013). The main independent variables are Total Net Official Development 
Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), and NODA from the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. While the first is used in the 
estimations, the last-two are used for robustness purposes to assess the consistency of the 
findings. We use government expenditure and public investment as control variables, in line 
with the foreign aid literature. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the 
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investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms have been substantially covered in the literature 
(Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 
2005; Reichel, 1995; Gomane et al., 2003; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Mosley et al., 2004 ; 
Easterly, 2005; Bird, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Benedek et al., 2012; 
Morrissey, 2012). 
 Details about the variable definitions (with corresponding sources), correlation 
analysis and summary statistics can be provided upon request. The summary statistics shows 
that there is quite a degree of variation in the data such that significant estimated nexuses 
would emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to avoid concerns of multicollinearity 
and overparametization.  
 For brevity and lack of space, we do not expatiate on the determination of fundamental 
characteristics which have been substantially covered in the literature (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 
2014bcd; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2008, p. 289; Asongu, 2012b, p. 191; Arvis et al., 2007; 
CIA, 2011; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008).  
 In order to control for endogeneity, the estimation strategy adopted is a dynamic panel 
estimation technique. Consistent with recent literature, there are some appealing features and 
one principal draw-back in using this estimation strategy (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; 
Asongu, 2013d). On the downside, the use of short-term time spans with data-averages 
implies that the findings should be interpreted as short-term impacts and not long-run effects. 
However, this setback is not a relevant concern for the present paper because data-averages 
are not employed. Accordingly, one of the prime conditions for adopting the Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) is not violated: N>T (53>15). With regard to the advantages, 
the principal arguments raised for the adoption of dynamic system GMM are: it mitigates 
potential biases of the difference estimator in small samples; it controls for the potential 
endogeneity in all the regressors; and it does not eliminate cross-country variation (Asongu, 
2013e).  
  Between the existing GMM approaches (Difference and System estimator) the 
empirical strategy adopted is the system GMM estimation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell 
& Bond, 1998) instead of the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991), in 
accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4). In modeling the GMM, we prefer the two-step 
option to the one-step because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. In the one-step approach, the 





3. Empirical results and discussion 
3.1 Presentation of results 
 Tables 1-2 below present the empirical findings. While Table 1 reports results on 
wealth (income-levels), colonial legacy (legal origin) and religious domination, Table 2 shows 
findings on regional proximity, natural resources, political stability and openness to sea. For 
both tables, the two null hypotheses for the validity of the models and absence of auto-
correlation are overwhelmingly not rejected. Hence, confirming the absence of 
autocorrelation and validity of the instruments
4
. While Panel A of either table investigates the 
effects on corruption, Panel B assesses the incidences on corruption-control.  
 From Table 1, the following findings can be established in Panel A. (1) The positive 
effect of foreign aid on corruption is most significant in: Middle-income countries (for 
wealth-effects), French civil-law countries (for legal-origin effects) and Christian-dominated 
countries (for religious effects). (2) The results of Panel B are not so significant to enable 
comparative inferences. It should be noted that the corruption indicators are measured in 
decreasing order by Transparency International; with the most corrupt countries having the 
least values.  
While the estimations in Table 2 suffer from some degree of freedom issues, two main 
results broadly standout: the aid-corruption nexus is more corrosive in non-oil exporting 
countries (Panel A). Moreover, there is also some scanty evidence of foreign aid increasing 
corruption-control in Lower Middle income and Not-landlocked countries (Panel B).  For 
both tables the baseline (or overall African) aid-corruption nexus results in the last column are 
consistent with recent literature and the control variables have the expected signs (Asongu, 
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Table 1: Wealth-, ‘legal origin’- and ‘religious domination’- effects  
          
 Panel A: Corruption 
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam  
Cor_1 -0.760 0.537 0.630*** 0.420 0.776** 0.236 0.586*** 0.612 0.591*** 
 (0.351) (0.047) (0.000) (0.180) (0.034) (0.351) (0.000) (0.452) (0.000) 
Constant 7.394** 0.127 1.25*** 1.164* 0.732 2.03*** 1.309*** 0.887 1.29*** 
 (0.010) (0.821) (0.000) (0.057) (0.635) (0.002) (0.009) (0.812) (0.000) 
NODA 0.221 0.036 -0.032* 0.017 -0.018 -0.02*** -0.036** -0.023 -0.027*** 
 (0.380) (0.279) (0.092) (0.327) (0.641) (0.001) (0.011) (0.834) (0.000) 
Gov.Exp -0.019 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.0004 -0.004** 
 (0.135) (0.402) (0.142) (0.203) (0.355) (0.182) (0.162) (0.986) (0.035) 
Pub. Ivt 0.060 0.141 0.024** 0.003 0.025 0.04*** 0.049 0.044 0.032* 
 (0.632) (0.121) (0.046) (0.872) (0.472) (0.000) (0.103) (0.783) (0.059) 
AR(2) -0.442 0.432 1.451 0.960 1.202 0.268 1.766* 0.013 1.764* 
 (0.658) (0.665) (0.146) (0.336) (0.229) (0.788) (0.077) (0.989) (0.077) 
Sargan 0.488 5.197 10.317 6.958 10.374 5.461 17.418 4.991 21.495 
Wald n.a  68.25*** 118*** 15.8*** 305*** 67.2*** 120.1*** 141*** 134.1*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obser. 60 69 129 74 107 96 153 50 203 
          
          
 Panel B: Corruption-Control 
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam  
CorC_1 1.778 0.276 0.888*** 0.877** 1.062*** 0.619** 0.998*** 0.503 0.842*** 
 (0.481) (0.619) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.242) (0.000) 
Constant 0.072 -0.857 -0.034 -0.125 0.112* -0.374* 0.015 -0.418 -0.108 
 (0.817) (0.166) (0.767) (0.733) (0.094) (0.077) (0.891) (0.161) (0.232) 
NODA -0.104 0.027* 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.695) (0.067) (0.552) (0.612) (0.522) (0.516) (0.864) (0.682) (0.368) 
Gov.Exp 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 
 (0.851) (0.266) (0.157) (0.300) (0.118) (0.082) (0.166) (0.023) (0.194) 
Pub. Ivt -0.006 0.050 -0.0003 -0.005 -0.019* 0.014** -0.004 0.011 0.005 
 (0.691) (0.208) (0.977) (0.610) (0.055) (0.026) (0.768) (0.279) (0.357) 
AR(2) 1.379 0.353 0.244 1.306 1.249 0.500 0.950 0.682 1.186 
 (0.167) (0.723) (0.807) (0.191) (0.211) (0.617) (0.341) (0.494) (0.235) 
Sargan 1.776 2.996 10.616 14.848 7.853 15.807 19.924 6.267 29.551 
Wald n.a 1063*** 41.23*** 87.2*** 848*** 46.69*** 199*** 8.180* 203*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) 
Obser. 49 60 109 86 83 112 137 58 195 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. 
Sargan: Sargan OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Pub. Invt: Public Investment. 
UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-
law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  Dom: 
Domination. na: insignificant estimate or variable not included in model. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 

















Table 2: Regional-, Resources-, Political Stability- and Landlocked-effects  
          
 Panel A: Corruption 
 Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
Cor_1 0.64*** --- -1.377 0.58*** --- 0.58*** 0.806 0.20*** 0.591*** 
 (0.000)  (0.541) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.248) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.06*** --- 5.054 1.38*** --- 1.38*** 1.923 0.0004 1.29*** 
 (0.000)  (0.462) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.460) (0.892) (0.000) 
NODA -0.028** --- -0.117 -0.03*** --- -0.03*** -0.038 -0.010 -0.027*** 
 (0.020)  (0.707) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.321) (0.120) (0.000) 
Gov.Exp -0.003 --- 0.022 -0.003 --- -0.003 -0.006 -0.003*** -0.004** 
 (0.167)  (0.200) (0.145)  (0.145) (0.216) (0.000) (0.035) 
Pub. Ivt 0.042** --- 0.114 0.037** --- 0.037** n.a  0.002 0.032* 
 (0.038)  (0.218) (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.541) (0.059) 
AR(2) 1.889* --- -0.649 1.772* --- 1.772* 0.352 1.382 1.764* 
 (0.058)  (0.515) (0.076)  (0.076) (0.724) (0.167) (0.077) 
Sargan 20.385 --- n.a  19.297 --- 19.297 4.144 13.539 21.495 
Wald 129.8*** --- 68.9*** 124.3*** --- 124*** n.a 28.6*** 134.1*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Obser. 174  27 176  176 51 132 203 
          
          
 Panel B: Corruption-Control 
 Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
Cor_1 0.878*** --- 4.116 1.02*** --- 1.02*** 0.652* -0.023 0.842*** 
 (0.000)  (0.280) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.089) (0.752) (0.000) 
Constant -0.068 --- 4.429 0.017 --- 0.017 0.023 -0.016** -0.108 
 (0.483)  (0.301) (0.863)  (0.863) (0.913) (0.010) (0.232) 
NODA -0.002 --- 0.050 0.001 --- 0.001 -0.022 0.006** -0.002 
 (0.612)  (0.749) (0.717)  (0.717) (0.224) (0.027) (0.368) 
Gov.Exp 0.002 --- -0.025 0.003* --- 0.003 0.001 0.002** 0.002 
 (0.193)  (0.212) (0.097)  (0.097) (0.307) (0.014) (0.194) 
Pub. Ivt 0.002 --- -0.186 -0.007 --- -0.007 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.800)  (0.222) (0.564)  (0.564) (0.838) (0.430) (0.357) 
AR(2) 1.081 --- n.a  0.573 --- 0.573 1.405 -0.024 1.186 
 (0.279)   (0.566)  (0.566) (0.159) (0.980) (0.235) 
Sargan 26.202 --- n.a  22.821 --- 22.821 4.968 19.724 29.551 
Wald 201*** --- 49.03*** 147.8*** --- 147*** 191*** 11.51** 203*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) 
Obser. 171  29 166  166 52 119 195 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. 
Sargan: Sargan OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Pub. Invt: Public Investment. 
UMI: Upper Middle Income. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: 
Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: 
Countries without significant political instability. Dom: Domination. na: insignificant estimate or variable not included in 
model. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) 
The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in 
the Sargan OIR test. ---: estimation not feasible due to issues in degrees of freedom.  
 
 
3.2 Discussion of results  
 Poor quality of institutions has been substantially documented as the one of the root 
causes of Africa’s poverty: lack of property rights, high corruption, weak courts and contract 
enforcements, hostile regulatory environment for private investment and political stability 
(Easterly, 2005). According to this narrative, in order to eradicate poverty in the continent, 
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more advanced nations need to promote good institutions. A growing literature has been 
devoted to assessing how aid influences the quality of institutions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; 
Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Asongu & Jellal, 
2013). For over five decades, this interesting development assistance literature has revolved 
around three main concerns. First, the issue of whether Donors allocate more to poor 
countries with good institutions. Second, the concern of if foreign aid leads to worse or better 
institutional quality. Third, the manner in which Donors use foreign aid as an instrument in 
improving government quality. The present paper that is positioned on the second strand has 
established that the positive effect of foreign aid on corruption is most significant in: Middle-
income, French civil-law, Christian-dominated, non-oil exporting and, landlocked countries. 
 On the colonial legacy effect, the fact that French civil-law countries become more 
corrupt with foreign aid than their English common law counterparts is consistent with the 
predictions of theoretical and empirical literature. The law and property rights theory holds 
that legal systems that place more emphasize on State power vis-à-vis private property rights 
tend to be more corrupt (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999). Hence the likelihood that 
a greater proportion of foreign aid will be misappropriated when the institutional web of 
formal rules, informal norms and enforcement characteristics are poorer. Consistent with 
Asongu (2012c), the edge of English legal origins over the French colonial legacy has been 
extended to other management areas: more informative accounting standards (La Porta et al., 
1998), better institutions with less corrupt governments (La Porta et al., 1999) and more 
efficient courts (Djankov et al., 2003). These findings have broadly been confirmed in recent 
African literature on the weight of legal origins in government quality (Asongu, 2012b, 
2014c) and property rights institutions (Asongu, 2014e).  
 The higher positive aid-corruption nexus in Christian-dominated countries relative to 
their Islam-oriented counterparts could be explained by the weight of foreign aid in the 
fundamental characteristics. In essence, the former are averagely more reliant on development 
assistance than the latter: 11.36 versus 9.79 as a percentage of GDP. Another explanation 
could be that the punishment against corruption related to foreign aid maybe less severe in the 
former than in the latter set of countries. 
 The reason Non-oil exporting countries are more exposed to corruption as a result of 
development assistance is simple. In fact, petroleum exporting countries averagely receive far 




 The fact that aid leads to more corruption-control in countries that are open to the sea, 
relative to their landlocked counterparts is expected.  This is essentially because apart from 
the higher institutional cost of being closed from the sea, landlocked countries also averagely 
receive more aid: 12.55 versus 10.06 as a percentage of GDP.  
  
 
4. Conclusion  
 We have assembled more pieces on the puzzle of the aid-corruption nexus. In essence, 
have we extended the debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption by providing evidence 
on dynamic effects of wealth, legal origin, religious-domination, regional proximity, openness 
to sea, natural resources and politico-economic stability. The empirical evidence from 
dynamic panel GMM estimation is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. 
The findings show that the positive effect of foreign aid on corruption is most significant in: 
Middle-income, French civil-law, Christian-dominated, non-oil exporting and landlocked 
countries. Moreover, there is also some scanty evidence of foreign aid increasing corruption-
control in Lower Middle income and Not-landlocked countries. Justifications for the 
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